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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
The re-issuance of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit for discharges from the Moutard Electric 
Generating Station (MEGS) by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Region XII was petitioned for review by EnerProg, 
L.L.C., the permittee, and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc., an 
environmental group. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 124.19 (2017), the 
authority to review was reserved to the Environmental Appeals 
Board (EAB), which denied both petitions for review. A notice of 
appeal was timely filed by both parties seeking review under this 
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 509(b) of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2012). The petitions have been 
rightfully consolidated by this Court for the purpose of its review. 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 
I. Does the EPA have jurisdiction to review the permit 
conditions imposed by a State? 
 
II. Are the conditions imposed under State of Progress law 
consistent with section 401(d) of the Clean Water Act, 
independent of whether EPA has jurisdiction to review 
State required permit conditions? 
 
III. Does the April 25, 2017 Notice issued by EPA suspend 
permit compliance deadlines for certain requirements 
promulgated under the 2015 Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines for the Steam Power Generating Industry? 
 
IV. Notwithstanding 2015 Effluent Guidelines, is Best 
Professional Judgment valid alternative grounds to require 
zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes? 
 
V. Is the MEGS coal ash pond a water of the United States 
subject to section 402 permitting requirements? 
 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
  
2018] BEST BRIEF OVERALL 73 
VI. Does closure of the MEGS coal ash pond require a fill permit 
subject to CWA section 404? 
 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
 
I. Facts 
 
The Moutard Electric Generating Station (MEGS) is a coal-
fired steam electric power plant owned and operated by EnerProg, 
L.L.C. in the State of Progress. In re EnerProg, L.L.C., NPDES 
Appeal No. 17-0123, slip op. at 6 (EAB, 2017). The MEGS plant 
provides baseload generating capacity for Progress, with a 
maximum dependable capacity of 745 megawatts (MW). Id. at 7. 
The MEGS plant draws water from the nearby Moutard Reservoir 
to produce steam for electricity generation. Id. Overall, the facility 
has an actual intake flow of less than 125 million gallons per day 
(MGD) from the Moutard Reservoir. Id. This water is used in the 
plant’s closed-cycle cooling system via operation of a cooling tower, 
as well as in the transport and treatment of coal ash waste created 
through electricity production. Id. This wastewater undergoes 
treatment through sedimentation in a coal ash pond before it is 
discharged back into the Moutard Reservoir via a riser structure 
at Outfall 002. Id. The coal ash pond is a free-standing body of 
water created in 1978 by impounding waters from the upper reach 
of Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to the Progress River. Id. 
The EPA regulates discharges from Outfall 002 under the 
authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA) which prohibits the 
discharge of any pollutants into regulated waterways without a 
permit issued under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) or other approved state permitting program. 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (2012); EnerProg, slip op. at 7. Direct 
discharges from the MEGS facility into the Moutard Reservoir via 
Outfall 002 are authorized and regulated under an NPDES permit 
issued by EPA Region XII. Id. 
The NPDES permitting process requires EPA Region XII staff 
to work closely with regulatory authorities in the State of Progress 
to ensure that any discharges authorized under the permit are in 
compliance with federal effluent limits and water quality 
standards under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. This relationship 
underlines the EPA’s congressional directive to improve and 
3
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promote the health of the nation’s waterways through enforcement 
of federal standards in cooperation with state and local 
government. See Congressional Declaration of Goals and Policy, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251. The section 401 state certification process 
exemplifies this approach, wherein the state affirms that a 
proposed NPDES permit meets all relevant CWA standards and 
applicable state law. Id. §§ 1341(a)(1), 1342. In the present case, 
the certifying entity is the State of Progress. EnerProg, slip op. at 
6. 
As part of its certification, the State of Progress sought to 
include conditions requiring EnerProg to cease operation of its coal 
ash pond by November 1, 2018, completely dewater the pond by 
September 1, 2019, and cover the dewatered pond with an 
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. Id. The conditions are 
rooted in the State of Progress Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA), and 
additionally entail rerouting of all ash transport waters currently 
discharged into the coal ash pond to a new lined retention basin. 
Id. at 9. Shutting down the coal ash pond as a part of the transition 
to dry-handling of coal ash wastes would necessarily eliminate 
direct discharges of bottom ash and fly ash discharges (“ash 
handling wastes”) from the pond to the Moutard Reservoir at 
Outfall 002. These wastes include elevated levels of mercury, 
arsenic, and selenium, which are toxic chemicals regulated by the 
EPA. Id. 
EPA Region XII staff reviewed the proposed requirements of 
the section 401 certification for both feasibility and consistency 
with federal water quality standards. Id. at 9. Upon review, Agency 
staff found that the section 401 certification conditions proposed by 
the State of Progress were consistent with CWA pollution and 
water quality standards. Id. Specifically, the permit writer 
concluded that a transition to dry-handling of coal ash wastes, 
which eliminates toxic discharges associated with ash transport 
waters, was feasible for the MEGS facility. Id. The permit writer 
thus determined that zero discharge of ash handling wastes by 
November 1, 2018—the date of closure of the coal ash pond—
constitutes Best Available Technology (BAT) for such discharges 
and was an appropriate permit requirement. Id. Zero discharge of 
coal ash handling wastes was determined to be BAT under the 
2015 revised Effluent Limitation Guidelines for the Steam Electric 
Generating Point Source Category (“2015 ELGs”). 40 C.F.R. 423. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
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However, compliance deadlines for the 2015 ELGs have been 
postponed by order of the Administrator, pending a legal challenge 
to the rule in the Fifth Circuit. See Postponement of Compliance 
Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric 
Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 
(Apr. 25, 2017). 
Upon completion of review and finding that the certification 
conditions proposed by the State of Progress were appropriate, the 
Region XII Administrator provided public notice and opportunity 
for a hearing on the NPDES permit in accordance with 40 C.F.R. 
§ 121.23. EnerProg, slip op. at 10. EnerProg, the MEGS facility 
operator, and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc. (FCW), a local 
environmental organization, both filed comments on the permit. 
On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII officially re-issued the 
NPDES permit to EnerProg. Id. at 6. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
Upon the EPA Region XII’s re-issuance of the NPDES permit, 
EnerProg and FCW filed timely petitions for review with the EAB 
requesting the permit be remanded to Region XII for further 
consideration. Id. EnerProg challenged the following: the inclusion 
in the final permit of a cap-and-closure condition in the CWA 
Section 401 Certification; the inclusion of zero discharge 
requirements from the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation 
Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 
Category; and, in the event that 2015 ELGs do not apply, EPA 
Region XII’s reliance on Best Professional Judgment to impose the 
same zero discharge requirements. FCW challenged Region XII’s 
determination that internal discharges into the coal ash pond were 
not subject to effluent limits under section 402, and separately 
challenged the requirements for dewatering and capping the coal 
ash pond as unauthorized without first obtaining a section 404 fill 
permit. The EAB denied both EnerProg and FCW’s petitions for 
review. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The EPA has the authority to review the permissibility of 
State of Progress certification conditions for EnerProg’s NPDES 
5
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permit under CWA section 401(d). The conditioning authority 
given to states under section 401(d) is not “unbounded.” PUD No. 
1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 
(1994). The bounded nature of state certification conditions implies 
that an entity must be entrusted with the authority to review such 
conditions. This entity must be the EPA based on its existing 
authority to review state water quality standards under CWA 
section 303 and its role in administering the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313 (2012); PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712–13. Therefore, the EPA 
has the authority to review state certification conditions based on 
similar authority already given to it under the CWA, as well as to 
preserve the regulatory balance between the EPA and states as 
envisioned by Congress in enacting the CWA. 
The State of Progress’ certification conditions requiring 
capping and closure of the MEGS coal ash pond constitute an 
“appropriate requirement of state law.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). In 
determining whether a state certification condition is an 
appropriate requirement of state law, courts first look to its 
consistency with other CWA sections pertaining to state water 
quality standards and effluent limitations. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 
713–14. Courts then look to its consistency with “additional state 
laws.” Id. The State of Progress’ capping and closure requirements 
for coal ash ponds can reasonably be seen as “narrative 
statements” consistent with state water quality standards as the 
requirements are set with the intention of ensuring that any 
leakage from the coal ash pond will not adversely affect the quality 
of surrounding navigable waters. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b); PUD 
No. 1, 511 U.S. at 715. Furthermore, these capping and closure 
requirements can also be seen as effluent limitations as their 
purpose is to limit total effluent from the closed coal ash pond to 
zero. Even if capping and closure requirements are not considered 
water quality standards or effluent limitations, they can still 
reasonably be considered appropriate requirements of state law 
based on the broad deference given to states under CWA section 
401. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 
386 (2006). 
EPA’s April 25, 2017 Notice is valid and effective to suspend 
the compliance deadlines of the 2015 ELGs pursuant to section 705 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 705 states: 
“[w]hen an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
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the effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review.” 5 
U.S.C. § 705 (2012) (emphasis added). A statute is interpreted in 
the context of any explicit definitions that Congress assigned to 
words pertinent to the statute’s language. See Burgess v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008). “Agency action” and “rule” have 
distinct definitions in the APA. Therefore, a plain reading of the 
statute suggests that Congress authorized an agency to postpone 
the effective date of an agency action, not merely the effective date 
of a rule. Because compliance deadlines are agency actions, the 
Administrator’s finding that “justice so require[d]” staying the 
compliance deadlines is valid in light of pending litigation 
involving the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. Furthermore, EPA 
was not required to undergo notice-and-comment procedures 
before issuing the Stay Notice, as the notice is not a rulemaking. 
If this Court upholds the Stay Notice, the zero discharge 
requirements can still be included in EnerProg’s permit on the 
basis of Best Professional Judgment (BPJ). In order to further the 
objectives of the CWA, Congress authorized the EPA to regulate 
pollutants and set effluent limits on a case-by-case basis when 
national guidelines are inadequate. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a). Courts 
are highly deferential to the technical expertise of EPA and its 
permit writers when reviewing BPJ requirements, and review such 
agency conclusions applying an arbitrary and capricious standard. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2015). 
Requiring zero discharge in this case is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious because it is the Best Available Technology (BAT) for 
MEGS discharges. 
This Court should uphold EAB’s determination that 
discharges into the MEGS coal ash pond are not subject to effluent 
limits. The EAB correctly held that the agency is not required to 
regulate discharges into waste treatment systems designed to meet 
the purposes of the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. FCW invokes a 
suspended clause from a 1980 agency rulemaking in arguing that 
the MEGS coal ash pond is not a wastewater treatment system. 
EnerProg, slip op. at 12. From a procedural standpoint, the 
suspension is a valid exercise of agency discretion and is consistent 
with both the APA and the CWA. As the EAB properly ascertained, 
the suspension reflects a longstanding policy determination of the 
agency and should not be disturbed. Id. Moreover, as the coal ash 
pond is already subject to end-of-pipe effluent limits, applying the 
7
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same effluent limits to waters entering the pond would render it 
inoperable as a waste treatment system. Petitioners cannot simply 
upend longstanding agency policy to force immediate closure of the 
coal ash pond. 
FCW’s secondary argument that the closure and capping of the 
pond would require a section 404 fill permit is similarly without 
merit. Id. at 12–13. The pond’s historical connection with Fossil 
Creek notwithstanding, the pond is not currently a “water of the 
United States” (WOTUS) subject to section 404 permitting 
requirements, nor is there any precedent to suggest that it will 
transform into a WOTUS upon retirement. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2. 
Furthermore, requiring a fill permit to close a coal ash pond is well 
outside the scope and stated objectives of section 404, and serves 
no clear purpose under the CWA. Therefore, this Court should 
uphold the EAB’s determination that a fill permit is not required 
for closure and capping activities. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. EPA HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE 
PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE OF PROGRESS 
CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS UNDER CWA 
SECTION 401(d). 
 
Section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) expressly 
requires that “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to 
conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the 
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency 
a certification from the State in which the discharge originates.” 
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Based on the certification authority given 
to states under CWA section 401(a), section 401(d) directs states to 
grant, condition, or deny certifications based on a state-conducted 
review of the activity to ensure consistency with CWA sections 301, 
302, 306, and 307 as well as “with any other appropriate 
requirement of State law.” Id. § 1341(d). The state authority to 
condition under CWA section 401 is not absolute. The EPA, as the 
issuing agency for NPDES permits, retains authority to review 
state certification conditions. 
 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
  
2018] BEST BRIEF OVERALL 79 
A. States Do Not Have Absolute Authority to Issue 
Conditions on Federal Licenses Under CWA Section 
401(d). 
 
A plain reading of CWA section 401(d) shows that state 
certification conditions are not absolute. States certification 
conditions must “comply with applicable effluent limitations and 
other limitations” under the above stated sections of the CWA and 
“any other appropriate requirement of state law.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(d). EPA regulations implementing section 401 provide 
further guidance on state certification conditions. The regulations 
require certifying agencies—the State of Progress in this case—to 
include “[a] statement that there is a reasonable assurance that the 
activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate 
applicable water quality standards.” 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) 
(emphasis added). While deferring to states to set certification 
conditions, the “reasonable assurance” requirement nonetheless 
bounds their authority under section 401(d). The Supreme Court 
in PUD No. 1 affirmed this interpretation, holding that “[a]lthough 
§ 401(d) authorizes the State to place restrictions on the activity as 
a whole, that authority is not unbounded.” 511 U.S. at 712. See also 
Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The 
certification power of the states under section 401 is not . . . 
unbounded.”). 
 
B. The EPA Is the Appropriate Authority to Review 
and Reject State Certification Conditions Under 
CWA Section 401(d). 
 
The bounded nature of state conditioning authority under 
CWA section 401 necessitates a reviewing entity. This entity is the 
EPA. This is evident upon a holistic examination of the CWA, 
particularly analogous sections providing states with authority to 
establish water quality standards. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) (“Statutory construction is a 
holistic endeavor.”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 
(1990) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not 
only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the 
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”). Additionally, this 
Court in interpreting CWA section 401 should be mindful of the 
9
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balance of regulatory authority between federal agencies and 
states. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (“The 
statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will pre-empt any 
state or local law that conflicts with such regulations or frustrates 
the purposes thereof.”). The EPA would effectively relinquish its 
congressional mandate under the CWA to regulate water pollution 
without the authority to review state certification conditions. 
 
1. The CWA Already Gives EPA the Authority to Review State 
Standards. 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Pronsolino v. Nastri explained that, 
pursuant to section 303 of the CWA, “[t]he states are required to 
set water quality standards . . . . If a state does not set water 
quality standards, or if the EPA determines that the state’s 
standards do not meet the requirements of the Act, the EPA 
promulgates standards for the state.” 291 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 
2002). The CWA already gives the EPA authority to review state 
standards, and EPA has similar authority to review state 
certification conditions under CWA section 401(d). This inference 
is further supported by the Supreme Court’s analysis in PUD No. 
1 outlining the link between section 401(d) and section 303 of the 
CWA: “Although § 303 is not specifically listed in 401(d), the 
statute allows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance 
with § 301 of the Act, and § 301 in turn incorporates § 303 by 
reference.” 511 U.S. at 701. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding 
that section 303 of the CWA is part of section 401 (by reference) 
and that state authority is bounded, it can be reasonably inferred 
that the EPA’s reviewing authority under section 303 also extends 
to section 401. 
The EAB erred in ruling that EPA does not have discretion to 
reject a state certification condition. EnerProg, slip op. at 11. In its 
decision, EAB cited American Rivers v. FERC, where the Second 
Circuit held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) did not have the authority to reject certain state-imposed 
conditions on hydropower project licenses. 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 
1997). However, the CWA establishes EPA as the predominant 
authority in implementing the Act, making its role distinct from 
other federal agencies in regulating state certification conditions. 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251. While other federal agencies such as FERC 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
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are given licensing authority under CWA section 401, it is clear 
that the EPA—as the administering agency of the CWA—has 
additional authority and expertise to review state certification 
conditions to ensure consistency with the CWA at large. The court 
recognizes this distinction in American Rivers stating that 
“FERC’s interpretation of § 401 . . . receives no judicial deference 
under the doctrine of Chevron . . . because the Commission is not 
Congressionally authorized to administer the CWA.” 129 F.3d at 
107 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)). Also implicit in the court’s holding in American Rivers 
is the assumption that the administering agency of the CWA 
should be granted judicial deference. This Court should therefore 
defer to EPA’s interpretation of CWA section 401 as giving EPA 
the authority to review state certification conditions. 
 
2. Without EPA Authority to Review State Standards, the 
EPA Would Be Subordinate to State Control in 
Administering the CWA. 
 
Courts have recognized the intent of CWA section 401(d) to 
give “broad authority” to states to include their own substantive 
policies in certification conditions. Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 
623 (D.C. Cir. 1991). However, courts are wary of giving states the 
final say in imposing certification conditions. In California v. 
FERC, the Supreme Court held that “[a]llowing California to 
impose significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements 
would disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in [this] 
considered federal agency determination” and agreed with FERC’s 
position that the significantly more stringent California standards 
would “interfere with its comprehensive planning authority.” 495 
U.S. 490, 506 (1990). A similar interpretation should extend to 
EPA in the case at hand. EPA’s position as a check on the authority 
of the states to set their own certification conditions is consistent 
with the intent of the CWA as stated above. 
The EPA is best positioned to review state decisions due to 
both its subject matter expertise and its unique vantage point 
allowing it to make assessments on inter-state water quality 
beyond the parochial concerns of states. This does not leave states 
without recourse, however. As evidenced by the case at hand, 
should states and the EPA be at odds over section 401(d) 
11
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certification conditions, the EAB and relevant courts have the 
authority to make final rulings based on the merits. This Court 
should therefore recognize EPA’s authority to review state 
certification conditions under section 401. 
 
II. THE ASH POND CLOSURE AND REMEDIATION 
CONDITIONS SET BY THE STATE OF 
PROGRESS CONSTITUTE APPROPRIATE 
REQUIREMENTS OF STATE LAW UNDER CWA 
SECTION 401(d). 
 
Parties do not dispute whether the MEGS coal ash pond 
requires an NPDES permit for discharges into the Moutard 
reservoir or that this permit is subject to state certification. 
Instead, the dispute centers on whether the State certification 
conditions related to the coal ash pond (the “CACA requirements”) 
fall within the scope of CWA section 401(d). The certification 
requirements set by the State of Progress fall within the scope of 
the CWA provisions on state water quality and effluent limitations 
referenced and incorporated in section 401(d). Even in the case 
that such requirements fall outside of the scope of these provisions, 
they would still fall within the broad conditioning authority given 
to states under the “appropriate state requirement” clause of 
section 401(d). 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). 
 
A. CACA Requirements Are Consistent with CWA 
Provisions Referenced and Incorporated by Section 
401(d) And Are Therefore “Appropriate 
Requirements of State Law.” 
 
CWA section 401(a)(1) states that a permit is required for any 
activity which “may result in any discharge into the navigable 
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). “Discharge” is defined as “any 
addition of any pollutant of navigable water from any point 
source.” Id. § 1362(12). If there is any discharge, “the activity as a 
whole” can be subject to “additional conditions and limitations.” 
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. Currently, end-of-pipe discharges from 
the coal ash pond are regulated under the NPDES permit. 
However, even after closure of the pond, the MEGS facility will still 
require an NPDES permit for other facility discharges (e.g., cooling 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
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tower blowdown and discharges from the planned retention basin). 
EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. Therefore, dewatering, capping, and 
other remediation conditions of the coal ash pond can be 
incorporated into this permit because “activities—not merely 
discharges—must comply with state water quality standards.” 
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. Moreover, pursuant to section 
401(a)(1), the mere risk of discharges from the closed coal ash pond 
renders it subject to CWA section 401 regulation. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(1) (“Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to 
conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the 
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing . . . agency a 
certification from the State in which the discharge originates.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 
1. Closure and Capping of the Coal Ash Pond Are Legitimate 
Requirements for Achieving State Water Quality Standards 
Under CWA Section 303. 
 
Section 303 requires states to establish water quality 
standards for both intrastate and interstate waters. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313. The Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 held that “ensuring 
compliance with § 303 is a proper function of the § 401 
certification” and that these state water quality standards would 
be “among the other limitations with which a State may ensure 
compliance through the § 401 certification process.” 511 U.S. at 
713. The EPA has consistently interpreted section 303 water 
quality standards to include numerical as well as non-numerical 
criteria. “Criteria” is defined as “elements of State water quality 
standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or 
narrative statements . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b). Courts have 
upheld the EPA’s non-numerical interpretation of “criteria.” See, 
e.g., PUD No. 1, 411 U.S. at 715. Capping and closure requirements 
qualify as non-numerical standards—or “narrative statements.” 
The requirements are intended to prevent significant 
contamination of waters in the event that pollutants from the ash 
pond seep into groundwater systems and enter surface waters 
regulated by the CWA; as such, they are clearly related to water 
quality standards. The possibility of pollutants discharging into 
regulated waters meets the threshold condition of CWA section 
401(a)(1), which requires only that the activity may result in a 
13
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discharge to trigger licensing requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
Therefore, the State of Progress’ inclusion of conditions for capping 
and closure of the pond are appropriate under the CWA. 
 
2. CACA Requirements for Ash Pond Closure and Capping 
Are Consistent with CWA Sections 301 and 302 
Establishing Effluent Limitations. 
 
The effluent limitations under sections 301 and 302 of the 
CWA pertain to discharges to surface waters. In establishing 
closing and capping requirements for the coal ash pond, the State 
of Progress is in effect setting an effluent limitation for the coal ash 
pond to zero. Id. §§ 1311– 1312. Even if this Court finds that the 
state capping and closure conditions fall outside the boundaries of 
regulating “the activity as a whole,” the coal ash pond can 
independently be viewed as a point source subject to CWA 
regulation. Under the CWA, a “point source” is “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). Courts 
have held that coal ash ponds can be point sources. See Yadkin 
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 
428, 443–44 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“coal ash lagoons are surface 
impoundments designed to hold accumulated coal ash in the form 
of liquid waste . . . [and] appear to be confined and discrete.”). Cf. 
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 763 (E.D. 
Va. 2017) (finding that coal ash piles are point sources and that 
any discharge that connects with surface water is broadly 
considered surface water subject to CWA regulation). 
Furthermore, even if a coal ash pond is dewatered, it is still a 
confined and discrete conveyance to nearby navigable waters that 
constitutes a point source. See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., No. 3:15-CV-00424, 2017 WL 3476069 (M.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 4, 2017). Therefore, even without the broad regulatory 
authority provided to states under the CWA, the state closure and 
capping requirements can independently be considered 
appropriate effluent limitations under CWA section 401. 
 
B. CACA Requirements Are Appropriate State 
Requirements Under CWA Section 401(d), as States 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/3
  
2018] BEST BRIEF OVERALL 85 
Have Broad Authority Beyond the Scope of the CWA 
to Impose Certification Conditions. 
 
Even if this Court does not deem the CACA requirements to 
be consistent with water quality standards or effluent limitations 
under the CWA, they are clearly “appropriate state 
requirement[s].” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). Courts have not explicitly 
ruled on the limits of the “appropriate state requirement” clause of 
section 401(d). However, in practice, courts have given broad 
deference to states and tribes in establishing standards under the 
CWA. For example, in Albuquerque v. Browner, the Tenth Circuit 
upheld ceremonial standards established by an Indian tribe, which 
were neither water quality standards nor effluent limitations. 97 
F.3d. 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996). The EPA has recognized this broad 
deference to states in its regulations implementing section 401, 
where it merely requires states provide “[a] statement that there 
is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a 
manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards.” 
40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). In PUD No. 1, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the EPA’s “reasonable assurance” 
standard to give broad authority to States under section 401. 511 
U.S. at 715. This deference fits within the federalism Congress 
envisioned in enacting the CWA. See S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 
386 (“State certifications under § 401 are essential in the scheme 
to preserve state authority to address the broad range of 
pollution.”). Therefore, state capping and closure requirements fall 
within the “appropriate state requirements” clause under CWA 
section 401(d). 
 
III. THE STAY NOTICE IS EFFECTIVE TO REQUIRE 
SUSPENSION OF COMPLIANCE DEADLINES OF 
THE 2015 ELGS UNDER APA SECTION 705. 
 
The April 25, 2017 EPA notice (“the Stay Notice”) is effective 
to require suspension of compliance dates for the 2015 Steam 
Electric Power Generating Source Category ELGs (“2015 ELGs”), 
including the November 1, 2018 compliance deadline for achieving 
zero discharge of coal ash transport water.1 See Postponement of 
Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the 
15
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Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017). 
EPA has specific authority under section 705 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to postpone compliance 
deadlines of its own duly promulgated rules “when justice so 
requires.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. Specifically, “[w]hen an agency finds that 
justice so requires, it may postpone the effective date of action 
taken by it, pending judicial review” Id. (emphasis added). The 
statute itself is silent on the definition of “effective date.” However, 
when read as a phrase, “effective date of an [agency action]” is 
clearly not the same as the “effective date of a rule,” especially 
when separate statutory definitions are assigned to “agency action” 
and “rule.” See id. §§ 551(4), (13). Because compliance deadlines 
are agency actions, EPA reasonably construed the statute to allow 
for the postponement of compliance deadlines. In this case, the 
Administrator determined that postponement of the compliance 
deadlines of the revised 2015 ELGs is required by justice, pending 
judicial review of the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. Furthermore, 
the Stay Notice does not require notice and comment procedures 
pursuant to section 553 of APA because it is not a formal 
rulemaking. See id. §§ 551(4)–(5).1 
 
A. EPA Reasonably Interpreted “Effective Date” in 
Section 705 of APA To Include Compliance Dates. 
 
EAB relied on a misreading of section 705 of the APA in 
holding that the Stay Notice is not effective to postpone compliance 
dates of 2015 ELGs. EnerProg, slip op. at 11. As previously stated, 
section 705 allows an agency to delay the “effective date of an 
action taken by it.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. EAB appears to interpret 
“effective date of an action” to mean the “effective date of a rule.” 
Such a reading does not comport with the plain text of the statute. 
When a word or phrase is defined in a statute, that definition 
governs as long as it is applicable in the context used and does not 
conflict with other language in the statute or its purpose. See, e.g., 
                                                          
1 Regardless of the validity of the Stay Notice, EnerProg is separately required by its 
NPDES permit to achieve zero discharge by November 1, 2018. This requirement was 
included by the permit writer applying Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) in the drafting 
process, and is discussed further in Section IV. 
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FCC v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397, 404–407 (2011) (holding that the 
undefined term “personal” is different from the explicitly defined 
term “person”); Burgess, 553 U.S. at 129, 135 (holding that “felony 
drug offense” should be read as per the definition in the statute 
because it is “coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive”); 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (upholding explicit 
statutory definition of “partial birth abortion”); Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (denying to extend the statutory 
definition of “viable” to “may be viable” because it would frustrate 
the purpose of the provision). 
On its face, the plain language of the APA does not 
communicate intent on Congress’ part that an action taken by an 
agency should be understood to apply only to the effective date of 
a promulgated rule. In fact, Congress has distinguished between 
“rule” and “agency action” in the APA. “Agency action” is defined 
broadly as “the whole or a part of any agency rule, order, license, 
or sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or the failure 
to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added). Whereas, “rule” is 
defined very specifically as: 
 
whole or a part of an agency statement . . . designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval 
or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial 
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services 
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices 
bearing on any of the foregoing. 
 
Id. § 551(4). The definitions enumerated in the APA clearly 
indicate that an agency action is meant to encompass a broad array 
of decisions and undertakings, only one of which is a rule. 
Compliance dates are but one of the types of agency actions and 
therefore, may be postponed pursuant to section 705 of the APA. 
See id. § 551(4)–(5), (13). 
Superimposing unstated restrictions on the plain text of a 
statute is inappropriate and should be avoided – particularly when 
doing so risks material injury to stakeholders by subjecting them 
to costly—and potentially unnecessary—compliance measures. 
More importantly, a restricted interpretation, which is 
unsupported by the statute itself, would frustrate APA’s purpose 
in granting an agency power to stay its own actions when justice 
17
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so requires, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be a 
primary consideration when interpreting statutes. See Colautti, 
439 U.S. at 392 (1979). Therefore, the Court should treat “effective 
date of action taken by [an agency]” to encompass compliance 
deadlines within the purview of APA section 705. 
 
B. EPA is Generally Authorized to Postpone Effective 
Dates of Agency Actions Pending Judicial Review 
When Justice So Requires. 
 
There are only two explicit factors that EPA has to satisfy 
under APA section 705 to stay the effective date of its action: (1) 
EPA must find that “justice so requires;” and (2) the action must 
be “pending judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Stay Notice meets 
both of these factors. 
 
1. EPA Reasonably Concluded That “Justice So Requires” 
Staying the 2015 ELG Compliance Deadlines. 
 
Within the purview of APA section 705, EPA concluded that 
justice required it to postpone the compliance deadlines in light of 
the significant compliance costs and uncertainty created by a legal 
challenge to the Rule. See Postponement of Compliance Dates for 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power 
Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 
2017). The Stay Notice merely purports to protect the status quo of 
the current industry environment, without imposing additional 
obligations or duties on regulated parties while the matter is being 
litigated. Id. This alone should satisfy the first factor of APA 
section 705 to postpone compliance dates. 
Moreover, it is important to note that EPA declared its intent 
to reconsider the Rule in the Stay Notice. Id. There is no question 
that EPA has the authority to revise its rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
Particularly, “change in administration brought about by the 
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
executive agency’s reappraisal” of its policies. Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). The Stay Notice was issued only months after 
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the new EPA Administrator took office. Agency review of previous 
policies and promulgated rules is reasonable under the precedent 
set by Home Builders. Furthermore, the CWA specifically 
authorizes EPA to review effluent guidelines. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d). 
These revisions would be subject to appropriate notice and 
comment rulemaking procedures pursuant to APA section 553, 
which would take considerable time to complete. Meanwhile, EPA 
is taking additional steps to address issues raised by other 
stakeholders with the promulgated 2015 ELGs. See Postponement 
of Compliance Dates for the Effluent Limitations Guidelines for 
the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 
Fed. Reg. 26,017 (June 6, 2017). In light of reconsideration of the 
Rule, EPA has requested the Fifth Circuit to hold the case at 
abeyance, which was granted. Id. at 26,018, While reconsideration 
of a rule is not a sufficient reason to postpone effective dates under 
section 705, reconsideration in this instance is directly related to 
the pending litigation. Staying the compliance deadlines offers an 
immediate—and just— approach to relieve regulated parties from 
complying with standards that might be ultimately remanded (due 
to changes in the rule itself) or vacated. Therefore, EPA reasonably 
determined that justice so requires staying the compliance 
deadlines. 
 
2. EPA Issued Stay Notice Pending Judicial Review in the 
Fifth Circuit. 
 
In Sierra Club v. Jackson, the court held that a postponement 
of effective dates of an EPA action was inappropriate because the 
Delay Notice issuing the stay merely referenced the litigation in 
passing and did not ground the stay in the existence or 
consequences of the pending litigation. 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33 
(D.D.C. 2012). Unlike the Delay Notice of Sierra Club, the Stay 
Notice at issue was announced pending a direct legal challenge to 
the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. The stay is grounded in the 
potential consequences of this litigation as discussed previously. 
See supra Section III.B.1. Therefore, EPA is acting within its 
authority to stay the compliance deadlines pursuant to section 705 
of the APA. 
 
19
  
90 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 9 
C. The Stay Notice Is Not Subject to Notice and 
Comment Rulemaking Procedures Because It Is Not 
a Rule. 
 
A rule by definition is “designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). EPA is required to 
carry out specific procedures pursuant to section 553 of the APA in 
order to engage in rulemaking, which is the “process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. §§ 551(5), 553. In 
Sierra Club, the court held that a Delay Notice meant to “preserve 
the status quo does not constitute a substantive rulemaking 
because, by definition, it is not designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy” and was not subject to notice and 
comment requirements. 833 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(5)) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 EPA is not implementing, interpreting, or prescribing law or 
policy in issuing the Stay Notice. Similar to the purpose of the 
Delay Notice in Sierra Club, the Stay Notice here simply stays the 
compliance deadlines in order to preserve status quo until the 
judicial review of the rule is complete to prevent subjecting 
regulated parties to uncertain regulatory demands. Therefore, the 
Stay Notice is not a rule that would require EPA to initiate notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures before issuance, and it is 
effective to suspend the compliance deadlines pursuant to section 
705 of APA. 
 
IV. BEST PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IS VALID 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS TO REQUIRE ZERO 
DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH TRANSPORT 
WASTES, INDEPENDENT OF 2015 ELGS. 
 
The 2015 ELGs require NPDES permits to include zero 
discharge of ash transport water as a permitting condition. 40 
C.F.R. § 423.13. However, given the uncertain status of the 
compliance deadlines proposed by the 2015 ELGs, EPA can 
alternatively rely on Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) to require 
zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the Administrator to issue NPDES 
permits if discharge meets “such conditions as the Administrator 
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determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [section 
402]”). 
Technology based effluent limitations (TBELs), established by 
the EPA in ELGs, must be incorporated into NPDES permits. 33 
U.S.C. § 1314. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 563–564; 
Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. E.P.A., 161 F.3d 923, 928–29 (5th Cir. 
1998). However, TBELs are not all-encompassing. When there is 
no ELG that applies to the permit applicant’s specific discharge, or 
an existing ELG applies to only a part of the discharge, the permit 
writer is authorized under section 402(a)(1) of CWA to use his or 
her BPJ to determine appropriate TBELs. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–
(3); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). Unless BPJ application in these 
circumstances is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to the judicial 
review standard established in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, courts are 
highly deferential to the technical expertise of the permit writer 
and the agency in setting TBELs. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 
F.3d at 569, Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 933. 
If the 2015 ELGs are inapplicable, requiring zero discharge of 
coal ash transport wastes is authorized under the CWA through 
BPJ. EPA determined that dry handling of ash transport water is 
the best applicable technology (BAT) and therefore, a reasonable 
TBEL for this category. BAT, here, results in zero discharge. 
Furthermore, the permit writer reasonably concluded that MEGS 
can comply with this standard. Therefore, zero discharge 
requirement of ash transport as a TBEL is an appropriate exercise 
of BPJ because it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
 
A. EPA Is Authorized to Set Effluent Limits on a Case-
By-Case Basis Using BPJ Under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) 
and 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2), When ELGs are 
Inapplicable to The Permit Applicant’s Discharges. 
 
Under 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(3), which incorporates section 
402(a) of CWA, the Administrator and permit writer are 
authorized to use their best professional judgment in setting 
effluent limits for a specific plant where there is no applicable ELG 
regulating a specific discharge, or an existing ELG applies to some 
aspects of the applicant’s discharge but does not address others. 
See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding case-by-case permit issuance valid when categorical 
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regulation is not feasible); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 
156, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that BPJ is valid grounds to 
issue permits when there is no national guideline on the issue); 
Consolidated Permit Application Forms for EPA Programs, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 33,516, 33,520 (May 19, 1980) (discussing situations where 
permit writer’s BPJ must be used to set effluent limits). Case-by-
case effluent limits established through BPJ allow EPA to achieve 
the pollution reduction goals of the CWA when there are regulatory 
gaps in the promulgated national guidelines. 
 In the case at hand, EnerProg contests the inclusion of the zero 
discharge requirement in the re-issued NPDES permit. When the 
permit was issued, the 2015 ELGs were already in effect. See 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power 
Generating Point Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,837 (Nov. 3, 
2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). Under the 2015 ELGs, BAT 
was zero discharge through dry handling for ash transport wastes. 
40 C.F.R. § 423.13. Regardless of the status of the 2015 ELGs, the 
outcome would be the same for this permit. If the 2015 ELGs stand, 
the zero discharge requirement in the permit can be upheld on the 
basis of the ELGs. On the other hand, if the 2015 ELGs are vacated 
by the Fifth Circuit or this Court upholds the Stay Notice, the 
category-specific national ELGs would revert back to the 1982 
ELGs, which were in effect before the 2015 revision. The 1982 
ELGs do not cover all the pollutants pertaining to the MEGS coal 
ash waste (such as mercury, arsenic and selenium) that EPA is 
required to regulate. See Steam Electric Power Generating Point 
Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 
52,290, 52,307 (Nov. 19, 1982) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 125, 423). 
Where such regulatory gaps exist, EPA is empowered to enforce 
pollution limits on a case-by-case basis using BPJ even when such 
limits are more stringent than national standards. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 125.3(c)(2)–(3). See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d at 201–202 
(holding that stricter standards imposed through BPJ are valid 
even if the ELGs in effect are more lenient). Therefore, use of BPJ 
in this instance would be appropriate, if the 1982 ELGs (not the 
2015 ELGs) are in effect. 
 
B. Courts Should Defer to EPA’s Expertise Because 
BPJ Application Here Is Neither Arbitrary nor 
Capricious. 
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The APA establishes the appropriate standard for this Court 
to apply in reviewing the agency application of BPJ at issue. 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).2 See also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 569 
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard to the review of 
NPDES permit); Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 933 (upholding EPA’s use 
of BPJ in formulating BAT as neither arbitrary nor capricious). 
Applying this standard of review, courts have largely enforced 
requirements imposed through BPJ. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. 
v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 201 (4th Cir. 2009); Texas Oil, 
161 F.3d at 933. See also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 569,; 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 29, 43. Regardless, EnerProg 
bears the burden of proving that the permit writer’s application of 
BPJ is unsupported by evidence or otherwise doesn’t conform to 
“minimal standards of rationality.” See Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 934. 
The permit drafting process and its consistency with the CWA and 
other agency regulations make it abundantly clear that petitioners 
cannot meet this burden. 
EPA specifies several factors that a permit writer should 
consider when setting BAT limitations as per 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c).3 
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(d). These factors overlap with the conditions that 
the agency itself must consider in promulgating the ELGs. 33 
U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). By considering largely the same factors, 
limitations set through BPJ are necessarily consistent with ELGs, 
other relevant EPA regulations, and the CWA itself. See EPA, 
NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual, 5–44 to 5–48 (Sept. 2010). 
The 2015 ELGs, which were subject to extensive notice-and-
comment procedures and stakeholder involvement, arrived at the 
same conclusion as BPJ application in this case: dry handling was 
BAT for this industry. Dry handling of coal ash transport wastes 
to achieve zero discharge is not even unique as an industry 
practice. In fact, 67% of facilities that EPA studied in formulating 
                                                          
2 “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law[.]” 5. U.S.C. 706(2)(A). 
3 Factors include: “[t]he age of equipment and facilities involved; . . . [t]he process 
employed; . .. [t]he engineering aspects of the application of various types of control 
techniques; . . . [p]rocess changes; . . . [t]he cost of achieving such effluent reduction; and . . . 
[n]on-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements).” 40 C.F.R. 
§125.3(d). 
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the 2015 ELGs were already dry handling or removing their fly ash 
transport through scrubbing. EPA, Technical Development 
Document for the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards 
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 4–
21 (Sept. 2015). Furthermore, the permit writer in this case 
determined that MEGS does not deviate from the point-source 
category significantly to merit substantially different TBELs, and 
that it is sufficiently profitable to adopt dry handling and achieve 
zero discharge with minimal economic impact. EnerProg, slip op. 
at 9. This finding has also been upheld by the EAB. Id. at 11. 
EnerProg may take exception to the EPA requiring MEGS to 
eliminate discharge of coal ash waste, but there is no real 
argument that use of BPJ in formulating this requirement was 
arbitrary or capricious – particularly when dry handling is already 
a widespread industry practice. EPA’s decision to incorporate this 
requirement in the permit through BPJ is valid in the case that 
the 2015 ELGs are vacated, and this Court should concur with the 
EAB’s judgment on this issue. 
 
V. SECTION 402 PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS 
DO NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE CWA EXEMPTS 
WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD DEFER TO EPA AUTHORITY 
TO IMPLEMENT THE CWA. 
 
Section 402 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants 
into “navigable waters,” from “any point source” unless in 
compliance with the CWA through issuance of a valid NPDES 
permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a); 1342. Navigable waters are defined 
as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 
Id. § 1362(7). “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) covers a 
variety of interstate and intrastate waters susceptible to use in 
interstate commerce, recreation, or aquaculture. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. 
The EPA has purposefully limited the scope of permitting 
requirements through exceptions to this definition. These 
exceptions include “waste treatment systems, including treatment 
ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of the Clean 
Water Act.” Id. EPA acknowledges that the definition of WOTUS 
and the scope of federal authority over certain isolated waters and 
wetlands has been a topic of debate among regulators, 
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environmental advocates, and industry groups in recent years. See 
generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality 
opinion) (failing to reach a majority consensus on the definition of 
“navigable waters” and the scope of federal authority over isolated 
wetlands); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding in a 5-4 decision that an Army 
Corps of Engineers rule extending scope of “navigable waters” to 
intrastate ponds used by migratory birds was not authorized under 
the CWA). 
In this case, however, the plain language of the CWA and 
implementing regulations are unambiguous: the EPA is not 
required to regulate discharges into waste treatment systems 
designed to meet the requirements of the CWA because these 
systems are specifically exempted from WOTUS under 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2. The MEGS coal ash pond clearly falls into this category: 
the pond acts as a settling basin for transport waters containing 
coal combustion residuals, where such waters can be treated prior 
to discharge into the Moutard Reservoir. These external discharges 
from the MEGS coal ash pond into the Moutard Reservoir at 
Outfall 002 are subject to effluent limitations and monitoring 
requirements, and are incorporated in the NPDES permit. 
EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. As a waste treatment system designed to 
meet the objectives of the CWA, discharges into the pond do not 
require an NPDES permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. 
The baseline WOTUS exemption for waste treatment systems 
was created by EPA rulemaking in 1980. See Consolidated Permit 
Regulations: RCRA; SDWA; CWA NPDES; CWA Section 404 
Programs; and CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 45 
Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 
124, 125). The original rulemaking included a final clause 
(hereinafter, “the exception”) stating “this exclusion applies only to 
manmade bodies of water which neither were originally created in 
waters of the United States (such as disposal area in wetlands) nor 
resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United States.” 
This final clause was suspended by notice of the Administrator 
prior to the effective date of the rule. See Consolidated Permit 
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980). 
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A. EPA’s 1980 Suspension Is Proper and Sufficient to 
Exempt Internal Discharges from Section 402 
Permitting Requirements. 
 
FCW do not appear to contest the substance of the pond’s 
function as a waste treatment system. Instead, FCW invokes the 
suspended clause of 40 C.F.R. 122.2 to argue that the coal ash pond 
should be subject to the CWA’s section 402 permitting 
requirements because the pond was created from an impoundment 
of Fossil Creek in 1978. EnerProg, slip op. at 7. According to FCW, 
the suspension of this clause (and by implication, the decisions of 
subsequent administrations to continue the suspension) is invalid. 
Following this logic, the MEGS coal ash pond is not an exempt 
waste treatment system under the regulations, and therefore EPA 
should be required to set effluent limits for discharges into the 
pond. For the reasons stated below, this argument is not 
persuasive. 
 
1. EPA’s Decision to Suspend the Exception Was an 
Interpretive Rule Not Subject to Notice-And-Comment 
Requirements of APA Section 553(b). 
 
FCW alleges that the suspension lacks statutory authorization 
and violates notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. 5 
U.S.C. § 553. Setting aside the fact that Congress clearly entrusted 
EPA with authority to administer the NPDES permitting system 
and define the scope of waters subject to permitting requirements, 
no relevant precedent exists to suggest that EPA’s suspension of a 
single clause within a rule prior to the rule’s effective date is 
sufficient to constitute a formal rulemaking under the APA. See 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1361(a) (authorizing the Administrator to promulgate 
regulations necessary to carry out functions of the CWA), 1342 
(requiring the Administrator set conditions of NPDES permits to 
ensure compliance with all relevant CWA pollution limits). 
Assuming—without conceding—that the EPA’s long-term 
suspension of the clause qualifies as a de facto rulemaking, it 
would be properly classified as an interpretive rule and thus 
exempt from notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). A rule is interpretive rather than legislative if 
the agency intends the rule to be no more than an expression of its 
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construction of a statute or rule. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. 
v. Occupat’l Safety & Health Admin., 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). In distinguishing legislative from interpretative rules, 
courts analyze whether the rule creates any new rights or duties 
for regulated entities. See Air Transp. Ass’n of America, Inc. v. 
FAA, 291 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that FAA’s 
interpretation of a regulation did not represent a departure from 
any definitive prior FAA interpretation such that it should have 
required notice-and-comment). Courts have even granted 
deference to interpretive rulemakings when such rulemakings 
affect the substantive rights of parties. See Shell Offshore, Inc. v. 
Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001). 
Recognizing that the exception was overbroad, the EPA 
attempted to correct their mistake and suspended the clause 
containing the exception. EPA’s actions were intended to ensure 
the continued viability of wastewater treatment systems designed 
to meet the requirements of the CWA and avoid unintended 
consequences that would have resulted upon the effective date; 
namely, forcing the immediate closure of a broad class of coal ash 
ponds created from impounding surface waters. See Consolidated 
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980). The 
suspension did not create any new rights or obligations in 
regulated parties; instead, it merely reaffirmed the status quo. As 
such, it should not be considered a substantive rulemaking subject 
to notice-and-comment requirements. 
 
2. Even If Notice-And-Comment Is Required, EPA’s Action to 
Suspend the Exception Is Neither Arbitrary nor Capricious 
and Warrants Judicial Deference. 
 
EPA’s decision to suspend the exception, if held to the same 
standards of review as a rescission of a regulation, is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 463 
U.S. at 30 (holding that a rescission of an occupant crash protection 
standard is subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of 
judicial review). Instead, EPA’s decision in 1980 to suspend the 
exception—and the decisions of subsequent administrations to 
continue the suspension—reflect a well-reasoned policy 
determination made within the scope of the agency’s authority 
delegated under the CWA. 
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On May 19, 1980, the EPA issued an expansive final rule 
intended to consolidate permitting procedures for waste 
management programs under several different laws, including the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the NPDES and section 404 fill 
programs under the CWA. See Consolidated Permit Regulations: 
RCRA; SDWA; CWA NPDES; CWA Section 404 Programs; and 
CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 
(May 19, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 124, 125). On 
July 16, 1980, EPA decided to suspend the final clause containing 
the exception pending further rulemaking. See Consolidated 
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980). EPA 
explained this decision in the Federal Register, noting that the rule 
was potentially overbroad in subjecting existing coal ash surface 
impoundments to new permitting requirements. Id. 
EPA’s explanation here was likely understated. The exclusion 
would have required the shutdown of existing coal ash ponds 
created from the impoundment of waterways, including those in 
existence prior to the CWA. Coal ash ponds are already subject to 
end-of-pipe pollution controls for discharges. Under the exclusion, 
the ponds themselves would be considered WOTUS, requiring the 
same effluent limits for waters entering the ash ponds. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(a). Subjecting an enclosed pond to pollution controls for 
waters both entering and exiting the pond is not only 
burdensome—it defeats the purpose of coal ash surface 
impoundments. To do so would render the pond useless as a 
mechanism to remove pollutants from waters prior to their 
discharge back into circulation. Clearly, FCW is cognizant of this 
fact and intends to force the immediate closure of the coal ash 
pond. However, invalidating an otherwise viable mechanism for 
wastewater treatment is antithetical to the intent of the CWA. See 
Congressional declaration of goals and policy, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
 
B. Defining WOTUS Is Within EPA’s Mandate Under 
the CWA, and EPA’s Definition Thus Warrants 
Deference. 
 
Ultimately, the authority to define the scope of WOTUS begins 
and ends with the EPA. 
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When Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation, and any ensuing regulation is 
binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious 
in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (internal punctuation omitted)). Congress 
did not provide a definition of WOTUS in the text of the CWA nor 
did it speak to the types of impoundments that should be regulated. 
Instead, Congress entrusted EPA with authority to define the 
scope of WOTUS in furtherance of the stated objectives of the Act. 
Thus, EPA’s decision to suspend the exclusion warrants judicial 
deference. 
 
VI. A FILL PERMIT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR 
CLOSURE OF MEGS ASH POND, BECAUSE THE 
POND IS NEITHER A WOTUS NOR DO SUCH 
CLOSURES FALL WITHIN SCOPE OF SECTION 
404 PERMITTING. 
 
Section 404 of the Act provides the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers with authority to issue permits for the “discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). As defined, fill material means 
“material placed in waters of the United States where the material 
has the effect of: (i) replacing any portion of a water of the United 
States with dry land; or (ii) changing the bottom elevation of any 
portion of a water of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 
(emphasis added). The Army Corps and the EPA rely on an almost-
identical definition of WOTUS, although codified separately. The 
operative Army Corps definition—promulgated in 1993—never 
included the wastewater treatment exclusion discussed in Section 
IV, obviating the need for discussion here. See Clean Water Act 
Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,036 (Aug. 25, 1993) 
(codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 323, 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 
117, 122, 230, 232, 401). 
 
A. Neither the Act nor Implementing Regulations 
Include a Recapture Provision That Would Convert 
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the Coal Ash Pond to a WOTUS upon 
Commencement of Closure.  
 
The argument that the closure of the pond requires a section 
404 fill permit rests on the assumption that a coal ash settling pond 
situated on a former creek bed will revert back to a WOTUS after 
it has stopped accepting coal ash transport waters. This 
assumption lacks foundation in the text of the law, nor is it 
supported by any relevant precedent. Courts have only in limited 
circumstances addressed the question of whether a body of water 
can be “removed” from federal oversight through manmade 
impoundments or diversions. These cases do not hold sway in the 
present case, however, as they did not involve diversion of a stream 
for purposes of constructing a waste treatment system used in 
compliance with the CWA. See United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 
984, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding defendant’s actions to reroute and 
reshape an intermittent stream did not deprive it of status as a 
WOTUS subject to the CWA). See also George v. Beavark, Inc., 402 
F.2d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that a river once deemed 
navigable before construction of a dam remains a navigable stream 
and thus subject to federal jurisdiction). It is unclear if any court 
has found an unregulated body can become a federal water because 
of a historical connection to a former creek bed. 
Ultimately, EPA’s decision not to subject the MEGS coal ash 
pond to Section 404 fill requirements in reissuance of the NPDES 
permit reflects the agency’s judgment that doing so is not required 
by the CWA. In the absence of precedent or a clear directive from 
Congress, this Court must defer to the EPA’s reasonable 
interpretation of both the CWA and the EPA’s own regulations. See 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“If the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”). Likewise, the EPA is owed 
substantial deference in the interpretation of its own duly 
promulgated regulations. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 
(1965) (“When the construction of an administrative regulation 
rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in 
order.”). 
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B. Section 404 Is Not Intended to Cover Closure of Coal 
Ash Ponds. 
 
In the absence of informative jurisprudence, the physical 
characteristics of the MEGS pond clearly place it outside the scope 
of “navigable waters” requiring a fill permit. 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 
1362(7). This is consistent with EPA and the Army Corps’ 
interpretation of the purpose of the 404 permitting provisions and 
the Act itself: the legislative history of the CWA and the 
formulation of section 404 reveals congressional intent to protect 
wetlands, bays, estuaries, and river deltas from practices that 
threaten fish and other wildlife. S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9 (1977). 
This emphasis on protecting aquatic ecosystems is echoed in Army 
Corps regulations promulgated pursuant to section 404. See Clean 
Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,036 (Aug. 25, 
1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 323, 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 
116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 401) (“The underlying focus of Section 404 
is on evaluating, and, where possible, reducing and avoiding 
adverse effects to the aquatic environment.”). 
The MEGS coal ash pond is not an aquatic environment. It 
does not serve as a spawning ground for shellfish or a nesting area 
for birds or other wildlife, and there is no evidence that it will serve 
as one upon closure. It functions purely as a waste treatment 
system designed to meet the aims of the CWA by separating coal 
ash waste from transport waters. A cursory examination of the 
facts makes this clear. EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. Once the pond 
completes closure as required by the NPDES permit, it can no 
longer be considered a “water” based on any regulatory 
construction of the term. Indeed, the NPDES permit’s cap-in-place 
requirement entails a complete dewatering of the MEGS pond—
leaving behind nothing but a contained mass of solid coal ash. 
FCW’s implicit argument that the coal ash pond will revert back to 
a WOTUS does not comport with any reasonable conception of 
federal authority over waters. 
 
C. Even If This Court Finds the Coal Ash Pond Has 
Reverted to a WOTUS, the Coal Ash Pond Would 
Remain a Waste Treatment System Exempt from 
Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permitting 
Requirements upon Closure. 
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FCW relies on an overly-strict interpretation of 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(b)(1) to argue that the scheduled cap-in-place of the MEGS 
coal ash pond precludes reliance on the wastewater treatment 
exemption during the closure process. For many of the same 
reasons discussed previously, this argument lacks support in the 
text of the Act and implementing regulations, and is inconsistent 
with EPA and the Corps’ reasonable interpretations of their own 
regulations, which deserve judicial deference. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; 
33 C.F.R. § 328.3; Udall, 380 U.S. at 16. The Corps’ definition of 
WOTUS, like the EPA’s, specifically exempts “waste treatment 
systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet 
the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. FCW 
argues that the coal ash pond will no longer be a waste treatment 
system when it stops accepting coal ash transport waters and 
begins closure.  
Following FCW’s reading of the section 404 process, 
EnerProg’s good faith efforts to comply with the legal requirements 
of its NPDES permit—issued in accordance with the CWA—would 
itself constitute a violation of the CWA. FCW’s strict interpretation 
of the regulations implementing section 404 is at cross-purposes 
with the objectives of the CWA and is without merit. Neither the 
EPA nor the Army Corps reads the wastewater treatment 
exemption’s language “including treatment ponds or lagoons 
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act” to limit 
the types of wastewater treatment systems to only ponds or 
lagoons in operation. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) (emphasis added). See 
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 213 (finding that stream 
segments linking strip mining operations to downstream sediment 
ponds fall under the waste treatment system exemption). 
Dewatering and capping an abandoned coal ash surface 
impoundment in compliance with the NPDES permit and existing 
EPA regulations for disposal of coal combustion residuals can be 
reasonably viewed as a final step in the treatment process. See 
generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901; 40 C.F.R. § 257 (“Criteria for 
conducting the closure or retrofit of CCR units”). Again, where 
Congress has provided EPA with the authority to promulgate 
regulations implementing pollution control and solid waste laws, 
EPA’s reasonable interpretations of these statutes—and of its own 
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duly promulgated regulations— warrant deference. Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843; Udall, 380 U.S. at 16. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In re-issuing the NPDES permit for the MEGS facility, the 
EPA acted as the final arbiter in the permitting process, and 
appropriately exercised its authority to review permit conditions 
proposed by the State of Progress pursuant to the Section 401 
Certification process. In doing so, the EPA found that the capping 
and closure requirements of the MEGS coal ash pond were 
appropriate requirements of state law under section 401(d), as they 
are consistent with state water quality standards and effluent 
limitations under the CWA. EPA is not compelled to reject 
otherwise valid requirements proposed by the State of Progress 
simply because the federal law does not impose such requirements. 
With respect to the permit requirement of zero discharge of 
coal ash transport waters, EPA’s April 25 Stay Notice—issued 
under the authority granted to the agency under the APA— is 
effective to postpone compliance deadlines of the 2015 ELGs. 
EAB’s holding to the contrary is based on a misreading of section 
705 that artificially limits the agency authority to suspend 
compliance deadlines when “justice so requires.” Notwithstanding 
the validity of the Stay Notice, EnerProg remains bound by the 
zero discharge requirement, as EPA Region XII can alternatively 
rely on BPJ to require the same. As a matter of policy, the EPA 
seeks to avoid second guessing the determinations of agency staff 
made in accordance with their expertise and professional judgment 
within the bounds of the CWA. 
Finally, the EPA is not required to regulate internal 
discharges into the MEGS coal ash pond, nor does closure of the 
pond require a section 404 fill permit. Regardless of any historical 
connection to Fossil Creek, the pond is a waste treatment system 
designed to meet the objectives of the CWA and is therefore not 
subject to effluent limits on incoming waters. Likewise, the 
argument that the pond will become a WOTUS subject to 404 
permitting requirements upon retirement has no legal footing. 
Ultimately, the NPDES permit requirements were valid under 
federal law when the permit was re-issued, and they remain valid. 
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For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject petitioners’ 
claims and uphold the NPDES permit as re-issued. 
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